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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
citizenship. This principle governs even where the validity of the agree-
ment depends on the validity of the patent.120
In the instant case, plaintiff's New York suit on the contract was
stayed in favor of defendant's federal suit, which challenged the validity
of the patent.
The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the trial
court's deference to "the Federal court's expertise"'121 and "the interests
of comity, orderly procedure and uniformity.' 1 22 Because defendant's
contractual duty would be discharged if plaintiff's patent was declared
void, determination of the validity of the patent logically should be
decided before an action on the contract.123 The appellate court empha-
sized, however, that the fact "that plaintiff must rely on a patent in
support of his cause of action is not determinative and neither vests the
Federal court with jurisdiction nor deprives the State court of power to
entertain the action."'124
ARTIL 30- REMEDIEs AND PLEADINGS
CPLR 3031, 3033, 3034: Motion for settlement of terms is prerequisite
to motion for judgment under Simplified Procedure.
CPLR 3031 through 3037 provides a consensual Simplified Proce-
dure for disposition of cases. 125 Under section 3031, an action may be
commenced by the filing of a statement, signed by both parties or by
their attorneys, specifying claims, defenses and requested relief.12 Nei-
ther a summons nor pleadings are necessary, and submission is deemed
a waiver of the right to trial by jury.127 The parties may contract in
writing for submission of either present or future controversies, and
then secure specific enforcement under section 3033.128 Under rule
3034, in the event that one party to a contract refuses to submit the
controversy under Simplified Procedure, or if the parties are unable to
agree upon a statement, either party may move for an order directing
determination of the controversy pursuant to Simplified Procedure. 29
120 American Harley Corp. v. Irvin Indus., Inc., 27 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 262 N.E.2d 552,
553, 315 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1970), cert. denied, 401 US. 976 (1971).
12136 App. Div. 2d 987, 988, 320 N.Y.S2d 818, 820 (1971).
122 Id.
123 Lear Inc. v, Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1968).
124 36 App. Div. 2d at 988, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
125 See 7B3 MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3031, commentary at 231-35 (1970).
126 See 3 WK&M 3031.03.
127 CPLR 3031.
128 See 3 WKWM 3033.02, 3033.03.
129 See id. 5034.01.
1971]
ST. JOHN'$YLAW REVIEW
At this point there is a right to a jury trial on the question whether the
parties had agreed upon Simplified Procedure.'30
In Time Writers, Inc. v. Coleman,131 the plaintiff moved for a de-
fault judgment in an action allegedly commenced under CPLR 3031.
The court denied the motion, because plaintiff's action had been com-
menced unilaterally. Plaintiff contended that his action was authorized
by 3033 and 3034, on the ground that the parties had contracted to use
the Simplified Procedure set down in section 3031. The court indicated
that rule 3034, in conjunction with sections 3031 and 3033, requires the
plaintiff to move for settlement of the terms of the statement prior to
moving for a judgment.132 Plaintiff was advised to personally serve the
potential defendant, in order to empower the court to determine
whether the parties had in fact agreed to submit.133
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Stranger to prior suit properly held not bound by
previous determination of the issues.
Res judicata precludes relitigation of the same Cause of action be-
tween the same parties or their privies when the cause of action has pre-
viously been adjudicated on the merits. 134 Collateral estoppel precludes
relitigation of the identical issue actually litigated and necessarily de-
termined in a prior action based on a different cause of action in which
a party or one in privity with him participated. 135
Molino v. County of Putnam36 was an action for the wrongful
death and conscious pain and suffering of the plaintiff-administratrix's
daughter, who died from injuries sustained in a one-car accident. The
plaintiff sought recovery against Putnam County and against an indi-
vidual defendant, a passenger in the automobile, who had previously
recovered against the car owner, the decedent's father, in an action in a
federal district court. The Court of Appeals held that the principle of
130 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3033, commentary at 238 (1970). Section 3033(2) confers the
right of jury trial; rule 3034(3) provides the procedure through which it may be demanded.
181 67 Misc. 2d 258, 523 N.YS.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1971).
132 "It would seem that total compliance with § 5034 would be a prerequisite tO a
motion for judgment." Id. at 259, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 864. See 3 WK&M 3034.01.
133 67 Misc. 2d at 259, 323 N.Y.S2d at 864.
134 See, e.g., Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953).
135 See, e.g., 5 WK&M 5011.24 et seq.; Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York,
44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165 (1969). The New York test for applying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel involves two elements: (1) an identity of issue necessarily decided previously, and
(2) a full and fair opportunity to contest the previous decision. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r,
24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). See also The Quarterly
Survey, 44 Sr. JoHN's L. RIy. 135, 144-51 (1969).
186 29 N.Y.2d 44, 272 N.E.2d 323, 323 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1971).
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